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I argue that Plato holds a medical model of virtue as health which does not have the 
morally unacceptable implications which have led some to describe it as authoritarian. 
This model, which draws on the educational virtues of the elenchos, lacks any 
implication that all criminals are mad or all mad people criminals – this implication being 
at the source of many criticisms of Plato’s analogy of virtue and health. After setting up 
the analogy and the model, I defend my argument against two objections. The first  
claims that Plato's picture of virtue as health is unacceptable because it entails that vice is 
a defect and therefore that criminals are all mad. The second resists Kenny's 
interpretation but does so by attacking its first premise, i.e. that Plato believes virtue is 
some kind of health. I reply that both objections are misguided. 
 
 
 
A common worry of virtue ethicists who would like to make use of ancient Greek 
theories and arguments in developing their own is whether they can avoid excessive 
paternalism in defending the view that virtue leads to happiness. In this paper I address 
this worry, and argue that Plato can help answer it to some extent by developing a 
concept of flourishing which is couched in terms of psychic health. The equation of 
virtue with psychic health raises some very legitimate worries: does Plato think that if we 
are not virtuous, then we are all mad? Do his views entail that criminals should be 
subjected to psychiatric treatment? I will show that if we take the analogy Plato draws 
between virtue and health as seriously as he intended, we will be able to provide a good 
account of what the good life consists in and how to achieve it, and that we need not 
worry that if we fail to be virtuous we will be treated as mentally ill, because that is not 
what Plato’s model entails.  
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 I argue that Plato holds a medical model of virtue as health which does not have 
the morally unacceptable implications which have led some to describe it as 
authoritarian. This model, which draws on the educational virtues of the elenchus, lacks 
any implication that all criminals are mad or all mad people criminals – this implication 
being at the source of many criticisms of Plato’s analogy of virtue and health. After 
setting up the analogy and the model, I defend my argument against two objections. The 
first (Anthony Kenny) claims that Plato's picture of virtue as health is unacceptable 
because it entails that vice is a defect and therefore that criminals are all mad. The second 
(Howard S. Ruttenberg1) resists Kenny's interpretation but does so by attacking its first 
premise, i.e. that Plato believes virtue is some kind of health. I reply that both objections 
are misguided. In Section Four I strengthen my argument by showing how in the Laws 
Plato puts forward a progressive penology based on his analogy of virtue and health. He 
makes it very clear that penal law, when it is thought of as an elenctic cure, has little in 
common with retributive or even deterrent theories of punishment, and nothing in 
common with the view that criminals should be forced to receive psychiatric care. 
Finally, in order to substantiate further my claim that the Platonic model of virtue as 
health is viable and useful, I suggest a way in which it could be applied in practice as a 
way of justifying the widespread use of community service in criminal sentencing.  
 
1. The significance of the health analogy 
 
In this section I will try to establish that Plato does indeed claim that virtue or 
justice is some kind of healthy state of the soul.2 However, this is subsidiary to my main 
                                                 
1
 H. S. Ruttenberg (1986) ‘Plato's use of the Analogy between Justice and Health’, Journal of 
Value Inquiry, 20. See also Richard Stalley (1981) ‘Mental Health and Individual Responsibility 
in Plato's Republic’, Journal of Value Inquiry, 15. 
2
 Julius Moravcsik (2000) ‘Health, Healing, and Plato's Ethics’, Journal of Value Inquiry, 34, also 
argues that Plato takes the medical analogy seriously. His purpose in discussing the analogy, 
however, is to show that Plato uses it to support an understanding of ethics as techne. Thus, 
Moravcsik's discussion is  not entirely relevant to mine. 
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claim which I shall defend in the following section, that the model does indeed deserve to 
be taken seriously and that the attractive feature of Plato's conception of health is that it 
does not rely on a narrow medical model of cure and disease, but appeals to a generally 
more satisfactory model in which development and prevention are central.  
 The key claim I wish to defend in this section is that Plato intended the analogy of 
virtue health to be taken seriously. This does not necessarily mean that it should be taken 
literally, but that there should be a significantly large number of points of comparison 
between health and virtue so that we could be justified in using the term mental health to 
refer to virtue. The difference between taking the analogy literally and merely taking it 
very seriously is cashed out in the following problematic. Do we have a concept of health 
which is the same in bodily health and mental health, or do we have a concept of bodily 
health from which we derive a concept of mental health because there are many and 
obvious points of comparison between the good functioning of the mind and that of the 
body? Whatever the answer, we still end up, it seems, with a pretty solid concept of 
mental health, one which legitimises the psychiatric classification and treatment of 
mental illness. For this reason, I propose that we consider only the question whether Plato 
meant us to take the analogy seriously, without asking further whether he meant us to 
take it literally. 
 Plato's early and middle dialogues are ripe with evidence that he took the health 
analogy very seriously indeed. In the Republic, for example, he writes that justice and 
injustice  
are in the soul what the healthful and the diseaseful are in the body; there is no difference. 
[...] Virtue then would be a kind of health and beauty and good condition of the soul, and 
vice would be disease, ugliness and weakness. 3 
There are also many such references to it in earlier dialogues. In the Crito (47e-
49a) it is central to the argument for the conclusion that Socrates should not escape: if 
unjust actions harm the soul as unhealthy ones harm the body, then Socrates must avoid 
injustice at all costs, even that of his life. According to the Protagoras (313a-c) going to 
                                                 
3
 444c-e. 
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consult a sophist is to expose one's soul to a treatment or cure which may turn out to be 
harmful. At Gorgias 464a, Socrates explicitly says that there is a healthy condition 
(euexia) for the soul as for the body, as well as an apparent but false health for both. At 
480a-b, he recommends that one who does wrong go to a judge as to a doctor in order to 
prevent the sickness of injustice from festering under the soul and becoming incurable. 
 In the Republic Plato elaborates on what psychic health actually consists in. In 
Book IV he tells us that for someone to be psychically healthy, he must have  
attained to self-mastery and beautiful order within himself, and [...] harmonised these 
three principles [the three parts of the soul: reason, the emotions or high spirit, and the 
appetites], the notes or intervals of these three terms quite literally the lowest, the highest, 
and the mean, and all the others there may be between them, and [...] linked and bound all 
three together and made himself a unit, one man instead of many, self-controlled and in 
unison.4 
This harmony is attained when each part fulfils its proper role, which means that 
the rational part of the soul, aided by the emotional part (thumos), must rule over the 
entire soul 'being wise and exercising forethought in behalf' of it. (441d-e). That this is 
what psychic health consists in is deduced by Plato from a consideration that health in 
general depends on the establishment in something of 'natural relations' amongst its parts. 
Just as a body becomes diseased if its parts behave 'contrary to nature', the soul will not 
be healthy if the rational part does not rule over the appetites and the thumos. Because of 
this we should understand the analysis of the soul as tripartite in Book IV as an attempt to 
describe the mechanics of psychic health in the same way that a treatise on anatomy can 
serve to explain what it is to have a healthy body. Only by understanding how the parts 
relate to each other can we hope to understand how the whole functions.  
 From the picture of justice as psychic health, it follows that we can apply a 
medical model to our understanding of vice and virtue.5 A soul which is dominated by 
                                                 
4
 Republic, 443d-e. 
5
 For an argument that healthiness can serve as a model for understanding goodness, because 
moral goodness and physical healthiness have the same ontological and epistemic status, see Paul 
Bloomfield, 1997, ‘Of Goodness and Healthiness: a Viable Moral Ontology’, Philosophical 
Studies, 87. 
5 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy Vol. VI 2012 Issue 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
either the appetites or the thumos is, according to Plato, diseased or in some way not 
functioning as its full strength. In Books VIII and IX Plato explains the different ways in 
which a soul may be diseased. For example, the type Plato refers to as tyrannical, which 
applies to those who are ruled by their appetites, will inevitably 'always be needy and 
suffer from unfulfilled desire', 'be full of terrors and alarms', and be 'maddened by 
[...]desires and passions' (578a). These descriptions leave open the possibility that failures 
of psychic health manifest themselves over a wide range of disorders, from mere 
neediness to actual madness. We must bear this in mind when replying to critics who 
argue that Plato believes all non-virtuous agents are mad.  
 
2. How the model works: elenchos as therapy 
 
In this section I will show that the conception of health Plato worked with is not 
the narrow one his critiques have in mind, i.e. something that can go wrong only with 
sickness and be redressed by cures only. On the contrary for Plato, health is something 
that must be attained, and maintained, and things can go wrong at any time in the process 
without requiring medical intervention in the form of cure. It follows from this wider 
conception that only in very few cases does failure of mental health equate with madness. 
 The implications of the analogy for the medical understanding and treatment of 
vice, however, are clearest, not in the Republic, but in earlier dialogues, especially the 
Gorgias. There Plato presents an argument which pertains to the ways and means in 
which mental health can be achieved, and its conclusion is that in order to be mentally 
healthy, we must practice the elenchos, i.e. the Socratic method of inquiry. 
 Without suggesting that criminals should be forced to enrol in PHIL101 courses, 
Plato's linking of philosophy and health is useful because it shows both how his model of 
mental health corresponds to a medical model we are familiar with (one in which health 
is pursued as well as rescued) and at the same time different from a medical model we 
would find objectionable were it to be applied to the mental domain (i.e. that which is 
concerned only with cure).  
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 A medical model which most of us would be comfortable with would regard cure 
as a last resort only. It would emphasise preventive actions, negative (do not smoke, do 
not eat too much fat or sugar) and positive (exercise regularly, eat plenty of fruit and 
vegetable). And rather than listing the things we can and can't do, it would aim to develop 
'health consciousness', i.e. a disposition to think about what may or may not be good for 
one's health, an acquired disposition to prefer healthy foods and activities to unhealthy 
ones, and a certain familiarity with our body's reactions leading to a knowledge of what is 
in fact harmful or beneficial for our us. This would take care of development: people who 
are health conscious, or whose carers are health conscious, are more likely to grow strong 
and healthy, and less likely to contract diseases. 
 Health consciousness, however, is unfortunately not sufficient to ward off all ills. 
Luck and genes play a part in how long we can stay healthy, or even whether we are able 
to become healthy at all (congenital diseases may have nothing to do with how healthy 
the parents of the sick baby are). So cure, it seems, will be the most important part of any 
medical model after all. Whatever we do, we may become ill, and we will have to see a 
doctor for a cure. But this does not quite follow. A disease may be detected before it has 
properly developed, and actions can be taken to prevent it from developing without 
requiring a major intervention on the patient's body. For instance, a wound will be 
disinfected, so as to prevent gangrene, and the necessity of amputation; a mole will be 
removed, to stop cancer from developing, thus preventing future invasive treatment. This, 
however, the dealing with a minute symptom in order to prevent grave illness from 
developing, requires early detection of symptoms which may be invisible to all but a 
medical doctor. So what it requires is that we submit ourselves to regular check-ups so 
that anything unusual may be detected and dealt with before it becomes a problem. If that 
works, then we put one more step between us and serious medical intervention or cure. 
 Of course, this system of development and prevention may fail, the symptoms 
may be too minute even for a doctor to detect, or they may develop in between two 
check-ups (although not if the check-ups are close enough together), or worse, there may 
be no known way of stopping them from developing. In this case, we need to turn to 
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medicine for the purpose of curing illness, or if that is not possible, for palliative 
purposes. This, however, comes last in our expectations of what medicine should do for 
us. First we expect that it should help us grow strong and healthy, second that it should 
detect anything which is likely to develop into a disease or illness before it does. Cure 
should be, as far as most of us are concerned, a last resort only. In what follows I will 
argue that the medical model Plato uses when drawing the virtue/ health analogy is 
similar to the one I have just described, i.e. that in order to be psychically healthy one 
must follow the same three steps: first developing a healthy soul, second, checking 
regularly for symptoms of diseases, and third, cure as a last resort. 
 To become 'health conscious' means becoming aware of what will benefit or harm 
the body and acquiring a set of healthy habits, including diet and exercise. If the 
body/soul analogy is to hold, then the same must be true of psychic health. In order to 
acquire a healthy soul, we must first become aware of what contributes to its health, and 
actively seek it. In the case of bodily health, a doctor will tell us what it is we need to do 
in order to become healthy, and - if we're lucky - a trainer or maybe some health 
institution will help us stick to it. According to Plato, there is a mental equivalent to this 
kind of preventive therapy in the elenchos. The philosopher, like the physician, and the 
trainer, pursues citizens and urges them to 'set their thoughts on goodness', to stop 
worrying about secondary goods, such as wealth and get their souls into shape. Thus, 
Socrates sees his role in Athens in this way: he has to engage the Athenians into 
philosophical debate about the nature of virtue, the dialectical nature of the elenchos 
meaning that it will encourage debate and make the citizens take an active part in the well 
being of their souls6 
 By discussing philosophical questions about virtue, the Athenians become virtue 
conscious, i.e. not only do they come closer to understanding what virtue is, but they 
become habituated to thinking that virtue and virtuous behaviour matter, and thus are 
more likely to behave virtuously themselves. This mechanism of habituation, of course, is 
                                                 
6
 Apology 30a-b. 
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better described by Aristotle than by Plato, and we will come back to it briefly in the last 
part of this paper.  
 According to the medical model we described, the second function of the 
elenchos has to be to test the soul in the same way that a doctor will carry out routine 
checks on the body to detect any illness. This will enable the person whose soul or body 
it is to prevent defects from developing, and to acquire peace of mind if she is healthy. 
This must be what Socrates has in mind when at 487d, he compares Callicles to a 
touchstone, one which will tell him of the state of his soul, if he engages in an elenctic 
dialogue with him. 
 Although this passage is obscured by poetic licence and rather strong irony7, it 
none the less sheds some light on one of the purposes of the elenchos. If it turned out that 
an ideal interlocutor agreed with what Socrates believes about virtue, then not only would 
Socrates' beliefs be true, but his soul would be cared for and in good condition. 
Conversely, if the interlocutors disagree, then the beliefs held by them have to be further 
examined, for they might be false, and the soul which hosts these beliefs is unhealthy. 
 It is in this spirit that Socrates enjoins Polus at 475d to submit himself to the 
elenchos: 
Don't shrink from answering, Polus - you won't be harmed at all; but present yourself 
nobly to the argument (logos) as to a doctor; answer, and say either yes or no to what I'm 
asking you.  
  In this passage (473a-475d) the argument is presented as a doctor, and the 
elenchos as the cure. This confirms our hypothesis as to the second function of the 
elenchos: to test the patient's soul as a doctor would carry out a check on a patient's body. 
If the test shows that the soul is sound, 'well cared for', then there is nothing to worry 
about. If it does not, then the elenchos must perform its third function, i.e. cure the soul. 
 Just how the elenchos achieves this is probably what Socrates is alluding to at 
458ab when he remarks to Gorgias: 
                                                 
7
 Socrates claims that Callicles has three things which make him a good 'touchstone': knowledge, 
goodwill and free speaking - but it is obvious that Callicles has none of these. 
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For I think that being refuted (elenchesthai) is a greater good, insofar as it is a greater 
good for a man to get rid of the greatest evil himself than to rid someone else of it - for I 
think there is no evil for a man as great as a false belief about the things which our 
discussion is about now. 
Plato's view of how the elenchos affects mental health forces us to question the 
model of medical care as cure only, and its implication that the only way in which one 
can fail to be healthy is by being ill or diseased. Plato forces us to focus on what we know 
already, namely that physical development and maturation are necessary before we can 
stop worrying about bodily health, and that diet and exercise need attention in order for 
health not to deteriorate. Thus it would be a mistake to assume that the only way in which 
someone may fail to be mentally healthy is by being mentally ill - questions must be 
asked about the maturation and development of the subject's mind. This implies that it 
would also be a mistake to believe that any failure of mental health must be 'cured'. We 
do not 'cure' a child who is not growing enough, we control her diet and make sure she 
gets all the right nutrients, and we do not 'cure' an adult who is unhealthy due to being 
overweight until he has tried to modify his exercise regime.  
 Plato's model of mental health, therefore, does not imply that all criminals should 
be cured. It implies, however that everyone should pay greater attention to their psychic 
development so as to mature in such a way that we will not be likely to develop vicious 
character traits. So far, we are able to draw the following conclusion. Plato's use of the 
medical model does not imply that all who are not virtuous are mad and should be 
subjected to psychiatric treatment,8 or give up their autonomy to those who are not mad. 
What it does imply is that psychic health is not a given, but something which must be 
developed through careful maturation, and which must be watched over throughout one 's 
life - as it is true of physical health. Absence of virtue is thus more likely to mean 
                                                 
8
 Note that according to Plato, the best cure for vice is, at least some times, litigation: if one does 
wrong one should pay for it. (see Gorgias 480a-b). He believes that the process of being punished 
for what one has done can sometime correct the tendency which led us to do wrong in the first 
place. It is interesting that he believes in the curative power of punishment in the light of his 
critics' interpretation that all the non-virtuous are simply mad and must be restrained. 
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incomplete development than disease, and thus the adequate response is education rather 
than psychiatric treatment or confinement.9  
 
3. Replies to Objections: why we are not all mad 
 
In this section I will briefly address some well known objections to Plato's model 
of virtue as psychic health and argue that they are misguided in that they imply a wrong 
understanding of the model. I will show that if we take the model to be what I suggested 
it was in the previous sections, then the objections fail. First, I will look at Kenny's10 
objection that Plato's model is morally unacceptable because authoritarian. Then I will 
turn to Ruttenberg's11 reply to Kenny which argues that Kenny is taking Plato's model too 
                                                 
9
 My argument is derived from interpretations both of the Republic's concept of psychic health 
and the emphasis on earlier dialogues, mainly the Gorgias, on the use of elenchos to promote 
psychic health. But nowhere in the Republic does Plato recommend that we should all practice the 
elenchos on a regular basis. I suggest that this is due to the fact that in the Republic every citizen 
is supposedly living the kind of life that is best for him or her, and hence the conditions necessary 
for flourishing are already attained. Of course, Plato's idea of what the best lives are like is not 
one we should accept. Nonetheless, this answers leaves open the possibility that Plato both holds 
that Psychic health is important, and that in a non ideal world, the best way to achieve it is by 
practicing the elenchos regularly, by the time he is writing the Republic. The Sophist (230b-d) 
also draws an analogy between the elenchos and medical purging.  
10
 A. Kenny (1973). See also A. Flew (1973), for similar arguments. 
11
 Ruttenberg (1986). See also Stalley (1981) who argues in part for the same conclusion as 
Ruttenberg, i.e. that the health analogy should not be taken literally. He gives three arguments for 
that conclusion. First, Plato believes there is a gap between psychic and social justice, and hence 
there is no evidence that he wants to link social justice and madness. Secondly, Plato had  a well-
known dislike for doctors in medicine, and therefore he would not look upon them as a model for 
teaching virtue. Thirdly, he does not inspire himself from contemporary medicine.  For a 
refutation of Stalley's third argument, see J.W.Lidz (1994) ‘Medicine as Metaphor in Plato’, 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, vol.19. The second argument is unconvincing, as a dislike 
for doctors may not entail a distrust of medicine itself - one need only think that medicine should 
be performed differently, and Plato does have strong views as to what is entailed in seeking and 
preserving psychic health. The first argument takes a well known objection to Plato and reverses 
it: it is not the case that Plato fails to show successfully that justice in the city and justice in the 
individual are one and the same thing, but he believes there is a necessary gap between the two 
and those of us who understand the Republic differently are simply misinterpreting him. Again, I 
find this argument unconvincing and see no textual evidence for it.  
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seriously, and that Plato does not in fact believe that virtue and mental health are the 
same thing.  
 Kenny's objection could be summarised thus. If we say that virtue is health, then 
vice is sickness, mental illness. But the mentally ill are very vulnerable to the control of 
psychiatric doctors. They often have no choice as to whether and how they should be 
treated. Also, Kenny claims that according to Plato the mentally ill have no property 
rights and no right to the truth. Moreover, as Plato appears to believe that only the 
philosopher kings are virtuous, it follows that he must believe most of us are insane. He 
can therefore recommend a totalitarian regime in which we are all under the control of 
philosophers / psychiatrists.12  
 To understand Plato as Kenny does, we need to make two disputable assumptions. 
First we have to believe that all failures or insufficiencies in psychic health equate to 
madness, which is tantamount to believing that a head cold or a stomach upset is some 
form of cancer. I made it clear in the previous section that Plato does not make this 
assumption, but that he believes that one can fail to be perfectly healthy in many ways 
without justifying medical intervention in the form of treatment - not all mental 
insufficiencies are diseases. Secondly, in order to agree with Kenny, we also need to 
believe that psychiatric medicine is necessarily a coercive practice, i.e. that doctors do not 
recommend treatments, diets, exercise etc. but force them upon patients.  
 Neither of these two assumptions are assumptions that one would readily make, 
and there is certainly no evidence that Plato made them. Thus, prima facie, we have no 
reason to take Kenny's reading of Plato seriously. His interpretation relies on claims 
about the nature of mental health and medicine that we have no reason to believe Plato 
shared. Neither of these two assumptions are assumptions that one would readily make, 
and there is certainly no evidence that Plato made them. Thus, prima facie, we have no 
reason to take Kenny's reading of Plato seriously. His interpretation relies on claims 
                                                 
12
 See Kenny's synopsis of what is wrong with Plato's health analogy in Kenny p.23-4. Ruttenberg 
(1986) offers a successful systematic refutation of Kenny's interpretation, claiming that most of 
his references are radically misinterpreted. 
12 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy Vol. VI 2012 Issue 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
about the nature of mental health and medicine that we have no reason to believe Plato 
shared.  
 Kenny's supporting arguments are based, for the most part, on clear misreadings 
of the Republic.13 More importantly, his thesis, and the underlying belief that Plato's 
moral philosophy is motivated by totalitarian ambitions, rests on a misunderstanding of 
how the health analogy works, and of the kind of medical model it implies. Kenny 
believes that if virtue is a matter of health, then all vice must be madness, and that the 
proper treatment of madness is coercive. However, this medical model is a very poor one 
compared with the ones Plato would have been familiar with.14 In the previous section I 
                                                 
13
 In order to read all that Kenny does in Plato's health analogy, it seems that we need to 
misinterpret radically several passages from the Republic. The one reference Kenny gives to 
support his claim that Plato equates vice with madness 329d is in fact a reading of Sophocles by 
Cephalus on sex and youth. But there is no reason to think that Cephalus is speaking for Plato, 
nor does his reading of Sophocles obviously suggest an equation of vice and madness, merely that 
some of the impulses of youth are hard to master with reason. The second reference Kenny offers 
is the passage in which Socrates claims that it would be wrong to return a weapon one has 
borrowed to a friend gone mad (331c). From this he infers that Plato believes that the mentally ill 
have no property rights. But there are two obvious replies here. First, it is clear that there is 
nothing legalistic about Plato's claim: Socrates is talking about friendship, not rights. The leap 
from how one should behave towards a friend and legal rights is a big one: in many cases, what I 
owe to a friend and what they have a right to expect from me legally are very different, and 
nowhere does Plato talk of the legal treatment of madmen. Secondly, surely the type of property 
referred to in the example is relevant. Even if Plato was making a point about rights and mental 
illness, the relevant right is not property right, but the right to own weapons. It is unclear whether 
there should be such a right in the first place, but if there was such a right, it would not be 
especially controversial to suggest that it should not apply to the insane. 
Kenny's interpretation of 382c is also inaccurate. Falsehood as a drug is referred to again, in the 
context of friendship (we may lie to a friend who has gone mad) in order to illustrate a point 
about literary censorship, i.e. whether it is acceptable to represent the gods as lying (no, because 
apparently they don't make friends with mad people). This passage isn't obviously linked with the 
myth of the creation of the three classes at 414d-415a which is what Kenny seems to have in 
mind when he refers to the Guardians lying to their subjects. But even if it were, it is far from 
clear that it would provide any support for Kenny's argument. Plato does not say that the 
Guardians may lie to the subjects, but that he himself would tell a lie to all the inhabitants of the 
city, including the guardian, so as to preserve its stability (‘I shall try to persuade first the rulers, 
then the soldiers’). So if there is a suggestion that lying is legitimised by the madness of those 
who are lied to, then Plato thinks that the philosopher rulers are as mad as the rest! Ruttenberg 
(1986) offers a successful systematic refutation of Kenny's interpretation, however, his emphasis 
is slightly different from mine.  
14
 See Lidz. 
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argued that Plato's own development of the health analogy implied a much richer, and 
thereby not morally objectionable, medical model. 
 Ruttenberg's thesis is that Kenny and other critics such as Flew ‘misunderstand 
Plato by taking his analogy literally at critical points where he is reasoning 
analogically’.15 Ruttenberg, it seems, thinks that the best way to resist Kenny's conclusion 
that Plato's treatment of virtue as health is authoritarian is to claim that Plato does not 
believe that virtue is mental health. At least, this is how I understand his comment that 
the analogy should not be taken as literal - but, as I explained in section two, I do not 
believe that what is in question is the literal status of an analogy, but the extent to which 
that analogy should be taken seriously, i.e. what its limits are in terms of actual points of 
comparison. In any case, the analogy is not between virtue and mental health, but virtue 
and (physical) health. Whether Plato thinks there is such a thing as mental health at all 
depends at least in part on how seriously he takes the analogy. I have argued that he does 
think there is such a thing as mental health, that which he refers to as psychic harmony or 
psychic health. This is evidence enough that Plato meant the analogy seriously (if not 
literally) and therefore that line of criticism against Kenny is closed.  
 Ruttenberg does in fact believe that the purpose of the Socratic Elenchosis to 
educate the character. 16 However, he and I differ as to whether character development is 
a consideration of mental health. Ruttenberg fails to take into account Plato's rather 
plausible point that the mind is like the body in that it needs to develop properly and 
sometimes be redressed.17 Law and medical science when they are represented in the 
right way are able to perform these functions, as Plato believes. What this requires is a 
less narrow medical model, i.e. one which does not merely look to cure disease, but one 
                                                 
15
 Ruttenberg p.145. 
16
 ‘As a model it shows us that improvement in our lives depends less on litigation and medicine 
than education and change of character. This is the task that the dialogues portray Socrates 
engaging in’. Ruttenberg, p.154. 
17
 Lidz p4: ‘Medicine proves to be an especially apt metaphor for Platonic ethics inasmuch as it 
serves to remind us that, as with our body, the condition of our character requires development 
and care’. 
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which interests itself with development as well, (and correspondingly, an appeal to law 
which looks more to legislation than litigation). These models, legal and medical are in 
fact provided by Plato. The following section will show how Plato sought to apply the 
model to a penology in the Laws, emphasizing the educational aspect of punishment. 
Then I will argue that the model can profitably be used to answer questions in 
contemporary penology – in this case, about the use of community service sentencing. 
 
4. Is Platonic medical penology progressive? 
 
The idea that mental (and physical) healthcare is about helping development and 
maturation rather than simply detecting deterioration and curing through medical 
intervention, one suspects, could lead to very progressive views on punishment.18 Given 
the focus on the proper development of the individual, and the commitment to preventing 
the growth of vice instead of intervening once it has already taken root in the character, a 
penology embracing these principles would probably reject retribution in favour of 
reform and maybe deterrence. This does seem to be the case in the penology Plato offers 
in the Laws, where he emphasizes that education of the offender and reparation for the 
victim must be the prime focus of punishment, and its aim, to make the offender a better 
person, to repair the harm he has caused, and the rift he has created between himself and 
a section of his community.19 A good legislator is compared to a good doctor. Rather than 
bully and threatening the patient into taking drugs he knows nothing about, the good 
doctor discusses with him the cause of his disease, and the possible cures for it, and at the 
same time attempts to educate the patient in physiology and the care of the body. A good 
legislator, similarly, educates citizens by taking the time to compile non-threatening legal 
                                                 
18
 Indeed, it could be argued that penology cannot claim to be humanitarian unless it is backed by 
a fully developed moral psychology. Mackenzie makes this point in Plato on Punishment, p. 158, 
adding that Plato succeeds in doing this..  
19
 See in particular 862c. T. J. Saunders gives a detailed analysis of Plato’s penology with 
emphasis on its medical aspect in Plato’s Penal Code, Oxford University Press, 1991. See 
especially chapter 5. 
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advice.20 In any case, the intent of the laws should never be to hurt the offender, not even 
as retribution, but to make him or her a better person: 
Perhaps paying this penalty will teach him restraint and make him a better man: after all 
no penalty imposed by law has an evil purpose, but generally achieves one of two effects: 
it makes the person who pays the penalty either more virtuous or less wicked. (854C-
855a) 
 The general intent of the penology in the Laws does seem progressive. However, 
it could merely be so in surface, a critique which Saunders makes of the theory of 
punishment presented by the fictional Protagoras in the dialogue of the same name. In a 
short speech (342a-b) Protagoras states that punishment must aim to better the offender, 
and not to retaliate against the crime. Vengeful punishment is ‘bestial’, and not the work 
of a rational being. What we must do instead is make sure that the offender does not 
offend again. Although this is generally regarded as a progressive and enlightened view,21 
the lack of details provided means that it is in fact very superficial. As Saunders remarks: 
One can continue to ‘punish’ exactly as before, and explain to anyone who will listen that 
one is not doing it ‘for’ an offence, but simply regarding it as evidence for a lack of virtue 
which can be remedied by making the offender suffer so that he becomes a better man 
because he will be deterred from offending again. (162). 
 The claim that one is punishing ‘for the good’ of the offender, when it is not 
backed up by a system of punishment which clearly benefits the offender more than it 
harms him or her, is not progressive but hypocritical. Can this critique be addressed to 
Plato’s own penology? Here two points can be raised. First, Plato states several times that 
those offenders who cannot be made better should be condemned to die.22 Secondly, he 
claims that although the offender should not take into account the painful element of 
punishment,23 ‘we may use absolutely any means to make him hate injustice and make 
                                                 
20
 Laws 857b-859c. For a commentary on this passage see Saunders pp.140-141. 
21
 See Stalley ‘Punishment in Plato's Protagoras ‘ in Phronesis, XL,1, 1995, p.7. 
22
 Laws 855a and 863a. 
23
 Gorgias 480c. 
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him better’.24 So in fact, the lawgiver and the executioners have complete discretion as to 
how they choose to exercise their power on the offender: they can judge that the offender 
is not rehabilitable and sentence him to death, or they can decide that intense physical 
pain and privation will be the most effective means of making the offender a better 
person. 
 The first issue – should the law sentence to death those it cannot rehabilitate – 
will come back in some form in all reformative theories of punishment. When it becomes 
clear that somebody cannot be reformed, either because their character is too vicious, or 
because the methods we use for reforming are not well developed enough, something 
must be done with them. If to set them free is to present too great a risk to society, then 
they must either be killed, or else put into prison or a medical institution. Unfortunately 
no more humane alternatives have so far been offered for dealing with offenders who are 
perceived as both dangerous and beyond reform, within a reformative theory of 
punishment. It may be that a retributive element should be added to a mostly reformative 
theory in order to set limits to the punishments imposed, and in particular, to deal with 
those offenders that Plato would simply have killed. A sentence to ‘match’ their crime in 
a retributive way seems fairer than a decision to ‘put them away’, literally behind bars, or 
metaphorically by killing them. In practice, sentences for the kind of crimes that 
incurable criminals commit, e.g. multiple, horrible murders, tend to get sentences so long 
that the prisoner is effectively ‘put away’. 
 Regarding the infliction of pain as a means of character reform, Saunders offers 
the following speculation. Plato favours changes of regimen over drugs in medical and 
mental cures. This is what we saw in Section 3 in relation to the elenchos. But a change 
in regimen is often painful. So the pain in punishment occurs mostly at the beginning, to 
announce the change in regimen.25 But if Plato favours traditional methods of punishment 
– the Laws give us no reason to suppose otherwise - then the infliction of pain is not an 
                                                 
24
 Laws, 863a. 
25
 Saunders 177, Laws 646d-648c. 
17 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy Vol. VI 2012 Issue 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
effect of the change of regimen which is imposed for the betterment of the soul, but 
deliberate, and intended to hurt. Saunders replies to this that as the pain and the break up 
from an old regimen ‘march together’, the break up can be induced ‘simply by causing 
the pain’.26 This claim is implausible, at least when the pain and the change involved are 
unusual and not repetitive. Giving up coffee often induces headaches in the habitual 
drinker. Those headaches are qualitatively very similar to those caused by changes in 
atmospheric pressure. However, it does not follow that a coffee drinker who has a 
headache because of stormy weather will feel compelled, or even will find it easier to 
give up coffee! The pain does not cause the change.  
 Why then does Plato insist that there must be pain for there to be reform? I 
believe the answer lies in the analogy. Medicine, as Plato knows it, inevitably entails 
pain. In fact, painless medicine is a Twentieth century notion, one that would have been 
spurred by the beginning of anaesthesia which previously was absent from even the most 
painful and invasive surgical interventions. This realization that medicine need not be 
horribly painful has spurred us on to conceive of more and more painless cures, so much 
so that now even diets are designed so as to cause minimum discomfort with changes 
introduced progressively, and vitamin supplements prescribed so that the body does not 
react violently and painfully to the change.27  
 If the alliance of cure with pain is a historical one which has come undone with 
progress in medicine, then we have both an excuse for Plato’s over reliance on pain in 
punishment, and a good reason to believe that a modern application of Plato’s views need 
not be that way. One possible modern application of Plato’s medical penology, and in 
particular, of his conception of the elenctic cure, which does not involve the infliction of 
pain on the offender but still satisfies the requirements stated in the Laws that punishment 
should educate and constrain the offender, and at the same time repair the harm done. 
                                                 
26
 Saunders 174. 
27
 This attitude is also present in Stoic writings. See Epictetus (III.24.30): ‘The philosopher’s 
lecture room is a hospital: you ought not to walk out of it in a state of pleasure, but in pain – for 
you are not in good condition when you arrive!’ 
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